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Abstract
The vertical dialogue with the national courts of the EEA/EFTA States, in particular the
Supreme Courts, has assisted the EFTA Court in developing its case law concerning effect and
State liability. Through this jurisprudence, EEA homogeneity in the field of effect and State liability has been maintained. The EEA Main Agreement has been implemented in the domestic legal
orders of the EFTA States. EEA secondary law is being implemented in an ongoing process. The
same holds true for the rulings of the EFTA Court. There has, to this writer’s knowledge, never
been a case in which a national court refused to set aside a conflicting rule of domestic law, at least
not in a vertical context. That fact is also important from a reciprocity perspective. With respect to
the horizontal dialogue with the Community Courts, one must remember that in its Opinion 1/91
on the first version of the EEA Agreement the ECJ struck down a provision according to which
the Community courts would have been under an obligation to take into account the case law of
the EEA courts. In practice, the Community courts have shown openness in cases in which they
agree with the outcome as well as with the reasoning of an EFTA Court decision.

ARTICLES
THE EFTA COURT: AN ACTOR IN THE
EUROPEAN JUDICIAL DIALOGUE
Carl Baudenbacher*
INTRODUCTION
The New York University Project on International Courts
and Tribunals lists forty-three different institutions worldwide,
sixteen of which are currently active.' International courts and
tribunals are defined as permanent institutions that are composed of independent judges which adjudicate disputes between
two or more entities, work on the basis of predetermined rules
of procedure, and render decisions that are binding. 2 One of
these entities is the Court of Justice of the European Free Trade
Association ("EFTA Court"), the third European court after the
Court of Justice of the European Communities ("ECJ") 3 and the
European Court of Human Rights. The EFTA Court was set up
under the Agreement on the European Economic Area ("EEA")
and the Agreement Between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court ofJustice ("Surveillance and Court Agreement") of 1992.' It assumed its functions
on January 4, 1994, in Geneva, with five judges from the EFTA
States participating in the EEA Agreement: Austria, Finland, Ice* President of the Court of Justice of the European Free Trade Association
("EFTA") Court.
1. See Project on International Courts and Tribunals, The InternationalJudiciary in
Context, available at http://www.pict-pcti.org www.pict-pcti.org/publications/synopticchart/synoptic-chart2.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
2. See id.; see also The EFTA Court: Legal Framework, Case Law and Composition, available at http://www.eftacourt.lu/sitemap.asp (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
3. The term "Court ofJustice of the European Communities" has been understood
as including the Court of First Instance. See Scottish Salmon Growers Ass'n Ltd. v. EFTA
Surveillance Auth., Case E-2/94, [1994-1995] Rep. EFTA Ct. 60, 64, 1 13; Technologien
Bau- & Wirtschaftsberatung GmbH & Bellona Found. v. EFTA Surveillance Auth., Case
E-2/02, [2003] Rep. EFTA Ct. 52, 1 40.
4. See Agreement on the European Economic Area, art. 108, O.J. L 1/3 (1994)
[hereinafter "EEA Agreement"]; see also Agreement Between the EFTA States on the
Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice, art. 34, O.J. L 344/1,
at 5 (1994), modified by an agreement of December 29, 1994 [hereinafter "Surveillance
and Court Agreement"].
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land, Norway, and Sweden. After eighteen months of existence,
the EFTA Court was reduced from five judges to three due to the
accession of Austria, Finland, and Sweden to the European Community ("EC"). Since mid-1995, the Court has consisted of three
judges from Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway. Moreover,
there is a list of six ad hocjudges.
The establishment of the EFTA Court is an example of what
in legal theory is referred to as judicialization of international
law, or to use a rather problematic term, the proliferation of international courts.5 Historically, this step is to be viewed against
the background of the 1972-1973 bilateral Free Trade Agreements ("FTAs") 6 , concluded between the European Economic
Community ("EEC") 7 and the European Coal and Steel Community ("ECSC")8 on the one hand, and the EFTA States on the
other, which were characterized by an imbalance with regard to
the role of courts. With the ECJ, there was a common court of
the EC Member States, which was competent to apply the provisions of the FTAs and which ruled in the Hauptzollamt Mainz v.
C.A. Kupferberg & Cie K.G. a.A. case that provisions of the FTAs
5. See Cesare Romano, The Proliferationof InternationalJudicial Bodies: The Pieces of
the Puzzle, 31 N.Y.U. INT'L L. & POL. 709, 710 (1999); see alsoJonathan I. Charney, The
Impact on the InternationalLegal System of the Growth of InternationalCourts and Tribunals,31
N.Y.U. INT'L L. & POL. 697, 697-98 (1999); Jose E. Alvarez, The New Dispute Settlers:
(Hal]) Truths and Consequences, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 405, 405-06 (2003); Carl
Baudenbacher, The EFTA Court: An Example of theJudicializationof InternationalEconomic
Law, 28 EUR. L. REv. 880, 883 (2003) (regarding the EFFA Court in particular).
6. See Council Regulation No. 2840/72, O.J. L 300, at 188 (1972) (concluding an
Agreement between the European Economic Community ("EEC") and the Swiss Confederation, and adopting provisions for its implementation and concluding an additional Agreement concerning the validity, for the Principality of Liechtenstein, of the
Agreement between the EEC and the Swiss Confederation of 22 July 1972); see also
Council Regulation No. 2842/72, O.J. L 301, at 2-85 (1972) (concluding an Agreement
between the EEC and the Republic of Iceland and adopting provisions for its implementation); Council Regulation No. 1691/73, O.J. L 171, at 1 (1973) (concluding an
agreement between the EEC and the Kingdom of Norway and adopting provisions for
its implementation). Agreements were also reached with States that have since left
EFTA to join the European Community. See Council Regulation No. 2836/72, O.J. L
300, at 2 (1972) (concluding an agreement between the EEC and the Republic of Austria); see also Council Regulation No. 2838/72, O.J. L 300, at 97 (1972) (concluding an
agreement between the EEC and the Kingdom of Sweden); Council Regulation No.
2844/72, O.J. L 301, at 165 (1972) (concluding an Agreement between the EEC and
the Portuguese Republic).
7. Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
8. Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 261
U.N.T.S. 140.
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could have direct effect.9 On the EFTA side, a common court
was lacking, and the Supreme Courts of Austria and Switzerland,
the two EFTA countries following the monist tradition of integrating international and internal legal orders, ruled in the cases
Adams v. Staatsanwaltschaft des Kantons Basel-Stadt, Bosshard Partners Intertrading AG v. Sunlight A.G. (Berufung), and AustroMechana v. Gramola Winter & Co. that the provisions of the FTAs
on the free movement of goods and on competition could not
produce direct effect.1 ° In the dualistic Nordic EFTA countries
of Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden, such effect was excluded due to the lack of implementation of these agreements
into the respective domestic legal orders."
EEA law is essentially identical in substance to EC law. It is
being adopted from EC law on a continual basis.1 2 Therefore, at
the very heart of the EEA Agreement are homogeneity rules,
which essentially oblige the EFTA Court to follow or take into
account the relevant case law of the ECJ."3 The EFTA Court has,
as a matter of principle, always followed ECJ case law on the interpretation of EC law that is identical in substance to EEA law.
At the same time, the EFTA Court has, from the very beginning,
been called upon to answer legal questions that have not yet
been decided by the ECJ.1 4 In such cases, the ECJ and the Court
of First Instance ("CFI") have indicated their readiness to enter
into a judicial dialogue with the EFTA Court.
The EFTA Court is competent to hear cases originating
from the three EEA/EFTA States. Its rules of procedure are
9. See Hauptzollamt Mainz v. C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG. a.A., Case C-104/81,
[1982] E.C.R. 1-3641,
3.
10. See Adams v. Staatsanwaltschaft des Kantons Basel-Stadt, BGE 104 IV 175
(1978) (Switz.); see also Bosshard Partners Intertrading AG v. Sunlight A.G. (Berufung),
BGE 105 II 49 (1979) (Switz.); Austro-Mechana v. Gramola Winter & Co., 104 Rev. Int'l.
du Droit d'Auteur 138, 148-49 (1953) (Aus.).
11. See Ulf Bernitz, The E.E.C.-E.F.T.A. Free Trade Agreements, 23 COMMON MKT. L.
REV. 567, 578-81 (1986); see alsoJohn Forman, The EEA Agreement Five Years On: Dynamic
Homogeneity in Practiceand Its Implementation by the Two EEA Courts, 36 COMMON MKT. L.
REV. 751, 753 (1999).
12. The EFTA countries have certain rights in the enactment of EC law. See EEA
Agreement, supra note 4, art. 102, O.J. L 1/3.
13. See Surveillance and Court Agreement, supra note 4, art. 105; see also EEA
Agreement, supra note 4, art. 6, O.J. L 1/3.
14. See, e.g., Carl Baudenbacher, Homogenitdt - Parallelitdt - Going First - Betrachtungen zur Rechtsstellung des EFTA-Gerichtshofs am Beispiel der Rechtsprechung zur Betriebstibergangsrichtlinie, Festschrift ffir Bernhard Grossfeld zum 65.
Geburtstag, Heidelberg 1999, 55.
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largely identical to those of the ECJ. The most important types
of cases concern preliminary references by national courts of the
EEA/EFTA States, actions for violation of the EEA Agreement by
the EFTA Surveillance Authority, and actions for the annulment
of decisions of the EFTA Surveillance Authority by private plaintiffs or by governments of EEA/EFTA States.
I. THE NOTION OFJUDICIAL DIALOGUE
In recent years, Canadian and U.S. authors have postulated
a systematic dialogue between high court judges all over the
world.1" It is argued that in times of globalization, a global dialogue among supreme courts and international courts is inevitable due to the homogenization of legal problems around the
globe, the fact that human rights are by their very nature international, advances in technology that make dialogue possible,
and increased personal contact between the judges. This dialogue should not be subject to any constraints with regard to the
origin of an argument. That would mean, for instance, that
judgments rendered by African Supreme Courts should be taken
into account by U.S. courts including the U.S. Supreme Court,
even when interpreting the U.S. Constitution. One is reminded
ofJfirgen Habermas' concept of herrschaftsfreierDiskurst6 The respective proposals have, however, prompted harsh criticism in
the United States. Whether American judges should look
abroad in carrying out their tasks is particularly controversial
when it comes to the interpretation of the U.S. Constitution.
The respective questions are discussed under the heading of
"Comparative Constitutionalism." 7 Those who are in favor of
such comparison argue that a functionalist approach is needed
"in which the relevant unit of analysis is not a geographic entity,
such as a country or a region, but is rather the problem and its
legal solution." ' Some of them tend to emphasize, that in re15. SeeJustice Claire L'Heureux-Dube, The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and
the International Impact of the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L.J. 15, 15-16 (1998); see also
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 1103, 1103-04 (2000).
16. See generally JIDRGEN HABERMAS, 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (1981).
17. See NORMAN DORSEN ET AL., COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: CASES AND
MATERIALS 3 (1st ed. 2003).
18. See Ruti Teitel, Comparative ConstitutionalLaw in a Global Age, 117 HAv. L. REv.
2570, 2574 (2004) (referring to the famous German comparatist Rudolf von Ihering's
statement that "[T]he reception of foreign legal institutions is not a matter of nationality, but of usefulness and need. No one bother to fetch a thing from afar when he has
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cent times, the U.S. Supreme Court has been increasingly open
to referencing non-U.S. sources when interpreting the U.S. Constitution.1 9 Compared to other High Courts, however, the U.S.
Supreme Court has referred to non-U.S. views in a relatively
small number of cases, in many instances in a rather unspecific
way. 20 The most prominent example is the judgment in Lawrence
v. Texas, in which the U.S. Supreme Court found a Texas sodomy statute to be unconstitutional. 21 In Lawrence, the Supreme
Court referred to the judgment of the European Court of
Human Rights in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom.2 2 Opponents of
such dialogue have argued that using non-U.S. opinions in constitutional interpretation undermines U.S. sovereignty as well as
the domestic majoritarian impulse (in particular with regard to
capital punishment); that it is incompatible with the supremacy
of the U.S. Constitution over international law; that judges are
ill-suited to carry out comprehensive research so that there is a
danger of them acting as "bricoleurs;" and that international and
foreign materials may be used selectively. 23 The American attitude stands in stark contrast to the Canadian one. It appears
that Canadian courts, including the Canadian Supreme Court,
are very open-minded when it comes to taking into account nonCanadian experience.2 4
For high courts in European countries, looking to foreign
jurisdictions is not at all revolutionary. In particular, the supreme courts of small countries such as Austria and Switzerland
have always borrowed from their counterparts in other countries, including the United States. 25 In addition, the German Suone as good or better at home, but only a fool would refuse quinine just because it
didn't grow in his back garden"); see also KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAw 17 (Tony Weir trans., 3d ed. 1998).
19. See Teitel, supra note 18, at 2589.
20. See Sarah K. Harding, Comparative Reasoning andJudicial Review, 28 YALEJ. INT'L
L. 409, 417 (2003); see also Harold Hongju Koh, InternationalLaw as Part of Our Law, 98

AM.J.

INT'L

L. 43, 51 (2004).

21. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576 (2003).
22. See id. at 573 (citing Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, [1982] 4 Eur. H.R. Rep.
149).
23. See Roger P. Afford, Misusing InternationalSources to Interpret the Constitution,98
AM. J. INT'L L. 57, 57-58 (2004).
24. See Gerard La Forest, The Use of American Precedents in CanadianCourts, 46 ME. L.
REv. 211, 212 (1994); see also L'Heureux-Dube, supra note 15, at 17; Harding, supra note
20, at 413.
25. See Carl Baudenbacher, Judicial Globalization: New Development or Old Wine in
New Bottles?, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 505, 507 (2003).
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preme Court and the House of Lords have, in high-profile cases,
used a comparative approach.2 6 In other European countries,
comparative thoughts may have entered the minds of judges in
many cases. But the respective judicial styles may have prevented
the judges from making such lines of thought public. In any
case, the traditional inter-court dialogue in Europe was, and still
is, largely unstructured. It depends on factors such as the willingness of the individual judge to look abroad, and whether a
judge has been trained in a foreign country. A structured dialogue has emerged within the European Union ("EU") between
the ECJ and the Supreme and Constitutional Courts of the Member States. This dialogue is taking place within the framework of
the preliminary ruling procedure and is therefore vertical in nature, i.e., national courts are obliged to follow the judgments of
the ECJ.27 It is this European dialogue which has inspired some
2
of the most outspoken U.S. writers on the subject.
II. THE VERTICAL DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE EFTA COURT
AND THE NATIONAL COURTS OF THE EEA/EFFA COUNTRIES
The EFTA Court is cooperating with the national courts of
the EEA/EFTA countries under the Article 3429 of the Surveillance and Court Agreement preliminary reference procedure
which has been modeled on Article 23430 of the EC. In order to
26. See Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd. & Others, 1 A.C. 32,
23-32
(H.L. 2003) (presenting case law cited by the House of Lords); see alsoJudgeJoachim
Bomkamm, The German Supreme Court: An Actor in the Global Conversation of High Courts,
39 TEX. INT'L L.J. 415, 417-18 (2004) (discussing case law cited by German Supreme
Court).
27. Strictly speaking this obligation extends only to the Court which has made the
reference to the European Court of Justice ("ECJ"). In factual terms, the latter's preliminary rulings have, however, erga omnes effect. See Jeffrey C. Cohen, The European
Preliminary Reference and U.S. Supreme Court Review of State CourtJudgments: A Study in
ComparativeJudicialFederalism, 44 Am. J. COMP. L. 421, 434-44 (discussing erga omnes effect of ECJ rulings).
28. See Slaughter, supra note 16, at 1115; see also Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an
InternationalJudicial System, 56 STAN. L. REv. 429, 459 (2003).
29. See Surveillance and Court Agreement, supra note 4, art. 34, O.J. L 1/3 at 5.
30. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. 224/1 (1992),
[1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporatingchanges made by Treaty on
European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719 [hereinafter TEU]. The Treaty on European Union ("TEU") amended the Treaty establishing
the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC
Treaty], as amended by Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741
[hereinafter SEA]. The Treaty establishing the European Community ("EC Treaty")
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avoid constitutional problems in certain EEA/EFTA States, the
drafters of the Surveillance and Court Agreement have deviated
from EC law, particularly in two respects: (1) unlike national
courts of last resort in the EC with respect to the ECJ, national
supreme courts of the EEA/EFTA States are not legally obliged
to refer European law questions to the EFTA Court;3 1 (2) unlike
preliminary rulings of the ECJ under the Article 234 EC procedure, decisions rendered by the EFTA Court in response to a
question by a national court are, strictly speaking, not legally
binding on the referring national court. 32 In Article 34 of the
Surveillance and Court Agreement, 33 EFTA Court decisions are
referred to as "Advisory Opinions. ''1 4 In practice, the differences
between EEA law and Community law are, however, hardly visible. The EFTA Court has received requests under the Article 34
of the Surveillance and Court Agreement procedure by the Supreme Courts of Iceland, Norway, and Sweden as well as by the
Supreme Administrative Court of Liechtenstein in the fields of
public procurement, 35 the obligation of a foreign plaintiff to
provide security for costs of court proceedings, 6 motor vehicle
insurance law,3 7 the law of parallel trade and repackaging,3 8 and
freedom of establishment of managers, doctors, dentists, and
was amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union,
the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts, Oct. 2,
1997, O.J. C 340/1 (1997) [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam]. These amendments
were incorporated into the EC Treaty, and the articles of the EC Treaty were renumbered in the Consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European Community,
O.J. C 340/3 (1997), 37 I.L.M. 79 [hereinafter Consolidated EC Treaty], incorporating
changes made by Treaty of Amsterdam, supra.
31. See Surveillance and Court Agreement, supra note 4, art. 34, O.J. L 1/3.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See Fagtan ehf. v. Byggingarnefnd Borgarholtssk6la, Case E-5/98, [1999] Rep.
EFTA Ct. 51 (request by the Supreme Court of Iceland).
36. See European Navigation Inc. v. StarForsikring AS under offentlig administrasjon (under public administration), Case E-5/97, [1998] Rep. EFTA Ct. 59 (request by
the Supreme Court of Norway); Data Delecta Aktiebolag & Ronnie Forsverg v. MSL
Dynamics Ltd., Case E-7/94, [1994-1995] Rep. EFA Ct. 109 (request by the Supreme
Court of Sweden). After Sweden's accession to the European Community, the latter
case was withdrawn and subsequently referred to and decided by the ECJ in Data
Delecta Aktiebolag v. MSL Dynamics Ltd, Case C-43/95, [1996] E.C.R. 14461.
37. See Storebrand Skadeforsikring AS v. Veronika Finanger, Case E-1/99, [1999]
Rep. EFTA Ct. 119 (request by the Supreme Court of Norway).
38. See Merck & Co, Inc. & Others v. Paranova AS, Case E-3/02, [2003] Rep. EFTA
Ct. 101 (request by the Supreme Court of Norway).
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trustees.3 9 Opinions of the EFTA Court have, as a matter of principle, always been followed by the national courts. If a national
court were to refuse to follow those Opinions, it would bring its
country into breach of the EEA Agreement.4" Therefore, Opinions of the EFTA Court are, from a sociological standpoint, not
weaker than preliminary rulings of its big sister court, the ECJ.41
The EFTA Court refers to them as 'judgments."
In substance, the dialogue between the EFTA Court and the
national supreme courts has been particularly fruitful in the
fields of effect and State liability. From early on, the question
has been discussed of whether the so-called Community law constitutional principles of direct effect, primacy, and State liability,
which the ECJ recognized in 1963, 1964, and 1991, respectively,
also form part of EEA law. Through this case law, the ECJ has
established a monist system in EC law. Monism does thereby not
follow from a decision of Member States' law, but from Community law. The EEA Agreement contains regulations that at first
sight seem to speak in favor of a dualist approach. Article 7 of
the EEA Agreement states that acts corresponding to an EEC
regulation are not directly applicable, but shall be made part of
the internal legal order of the EFTA States. 42 Furthermore, Protocol 35 stipulates that the aim of achieving a homogeneous
EEA, based on common rules, does not require the contracting
parties to transfer legislative powers to any institution of the
EEA.4" On the other hand, the EEA Agreement emphasizes that
the protection of individual rights is of paramount importance,4 4
that the overriding goal of the EEA Agreement is to create a
39. See Herbert Rainford-Towning, Case E-3/98, [1998] Rep. EFTA Ct. 205; Dr.
Johann Brindle, Case E-4/00, [2000-2001] Rep. EFTA Ct. 125; Dr.Josef Mangold, Case
E-5/00, [2000-2001] Rep. EFTA Ct. 165; Dr. JfIrgen Tschannett, Case E-6/00, [20002001] Rep. EFTA Ct. 205; Dr. Franz Martin Pucher, Case E-2/01, [2002] Rep. EFrA Ct.
44 (request by the Supreme Administrative Court of Liechtenstein).
40. See Henrik Bull, The EEA Agreement and Norwegian Law, 5 EUR. Bus. L. REV. 291,
296 (1994).
41. See Hans Petter Graver, Die Ausdehnung des Europaischen Gemeinschaftsrechts auf
Nichtmitglieder der Union - das Beispiel Norwegens, ARENA Working Papers WP01/21
(2001), available at http://www.arena.uio.no/wp0l_21.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
42. See EEA Agreement, supra note 4, art. 7, O.J. L 1/3.
43. See Protocol 35 on the Implementation of EEA Rules, available at http://secretariat.efta.int/Web/EuropeanEconomicArea/EEAAgreement/EEAAgreement/protocols (last visited Feb. 21, 2005) [hereinafter Protocol 35].
44. See EEA Agreement, supra note 4, pmbl, 0.J. L 1/3.
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dynamic and homogeneous EEA,45 that the EEA Agreement as
well as the Surveillance and Court Agreement contain specific
homogeneity rules addressing the EFTA Court in particular,4 6
and that the Contracting Parties are under a duty to loyally cooperate within the framework of the EEA Agreement.4 7 Protocol
35 to the EEA Agreement states that the EFTA States undertake
to introduce, if necessary, a statutory provision to the effect that
EEA rules prevail in cases of possible conflicts between implemented EEA rules and other statutory provisions." The governments of the Nordic States, focusing on Article 7 of the EEA
Agreement and on Protocol 35, opined that the EEA Agreement
had recognized traditional Nordic dualism, and therefore direct
effect and State liability were unthinkable in EEA law.49 These
governments seemed to find comfort in the ECJ's Opinion 1/91,
in which that Court declared the originally planned establishment of an EEA judiciary consisting of ECJ and EFTA judges
incompatible with Community law. 50 The Opinion further assumed that the EEA Agreement was a simple public international law treaty conferring rights only on the participating
EFTA States and the Community.51 The principles of direct effect and primacy were found to be "irreconcilable with the characteristics of the agreement." 52 But influential authors, including two former judges of the EFTA Court and an Advocate-General ("AG") of the ECJ, stated that constitutional principles of
EC law were at least on balance part of EEA law.53 The EFTA
45. See id.
46. See id. arts. 105-07.
47. See id. art. 3.
48. See Protocol 35, supra note 43.
49. See Report for the Hearing and Oral Submissions of the Swedish Government,
Ravintoloitsijain Liiton Kustannus Oy Restamark, Case E-1/94, [1994-1995] Rep. EFTA
Ct. 35, 54, 11 89-91; Report for the Hearing, Sveinbj6rnsd6ttir v. Government of Iceland, Case E-9/97, [1998] Rep. EFTA Ct. 115, 125-29, 11 52, 66, 76; Report for the
Hearing, Karlsson v. Icelandic State, Case E-4/01, [2002] Rep. EFTA Ct. 255, 267, 1 51.
50. See Opinion 1/91 of the Court ofJustice on the EEA Agreement, [1991] E.C.R.
1-6097, 1 6.
51. See id. 1 1.
52. See id.
53. See Leif Sev6n, Primacy and Direct Effect in the EEA Some Reflections, in LIBER
AMICORUM OLE DUE 34 (1994); see also Walter van Gerven, The Genesis of EEA Law and the
Principles of Primacy and Direct Effect, 16 FoRDHiAm INT'L L.J. 955, 989 (1993); Thomas
Bruha, Is the EEA an Internal Market, in EEA-EU RELATIONS 97, 108 (Mfiller-Graff &
Selvig eds., 1999); Leif Sev6n & Martin Johansson, The Protection of the Rights of Individuals under the EEA Agreement, 24 EUR. L. REv. 373, 385 (1999); Sven Norberg, Perspectives
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Court went for what may be called "quasi-direct effect," "quasiprimacy," and "full State liability." The Court held in its very first
case, RavintoloitsijainLiiton Kustannus Oy Restamark, on December 14, 1994, that it follows from Protocol 35 that individuals and
economic operators must be entitled to invoke and claim at the
national level any rights that could be derived from the provisions of the EEA Agreement (having been made part of the respective national legal order), as long as they are unconditional
and sufficiently precise.5 4 In its 2002 Einarsson v. Icelandic State
judgment, the Court found that, according to Protocol 35, such
provisions take precedence over conflicting provisions of national law.55 National courts must be entitled to ask the EFTA
Court for an Opinion on these matters under Surveillance and
Court Agreement Article 34. In its 1998 Sveinbjrnsd6ttir v. Government of Iceland ruling, the EFTA Court held that the principle
of State liability for breaches of EEA law must be assumed to be
part of that law.5 6 After having confirmed its State liability jurisprudence in the 2002 Karlsson v. Icelandic State judgment, the
EFTA Court held, in dicta, that EEA law does not require that
individuals and economic operators be able to rely directly on
non-implemented EEA rules before national courts.57 At the
same time, it was considered inherent in the general objective of
the EEA Agreement of establishing a dynamic and homogeneous market, in the ensuing emphasis on the judicial defense and
enforcement of the rights of individuals, as well as in the public
international law principle of effectiveness, that national courts
will consider any relevant element of EEA law, whether implemented or not, when interpreting international law.5 8
National Supreme Courts made important contributions to
this outcome. With regard to the legal nature of Advisory Opinions, the Norwegian Supreme Court declared that although
opinions of the EFTA Court are advisory, they must be accorded
preeminent weight due to: (1) the task of the EFFA Court to
guarantee homogeneous interpretation; (2) the specialized
on the Future Development of the EEA Agreement, AFm2eLISRIT TH6R VILHJAIMSSON 367
(2002).
54. [1994-1995] Rep. EFTA Ct. 15, 37,
77.
55. Case E-1/01, [2002] Rep. EFTA Ct. 2, 5,
4.
56. Case E-9/97, [1998] Rep. EFTA Ct. at 97, 112-13, 11 62-69.
57. Case E-4/01, [2002] Rep. EFTA Ct. 240, 249
28.
58. See id.
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knowledge of the EFTA Court; and (3) the fact that Member
States and institutions of EFTA and EC have the right to submit
observations. 59 In another case, the Supreme Court stated that it
would take a great deal for the Court to depart from the EFTA
Court's interpretation of rules of EEA law.60 The Supreme
Court of Iceland similarly stated that Icelandic courts must follow the rulings of the EFTA Court save in exceptional cases.6 1
The Chairman of the Liechtenstein Administrative Court has recently stated that his court has adopted a policy of strictly follow62
ing the EFTA Court's opinions.
Regarding effect and State liability, the Liechtenstein State
Court ("Constitutional Court"), in an expert opinion of December 11, 1995, found that provisions of EEA law are effective in
domestic law as they enter into force as public international law
insofar as they are self-executing; no national act of transformation is needed.6" In a judgment of May 3, 1999, the same Court
held that EEA law takes precedence over conflicting domestic
law including national constitutional law according to EEA
Agreement Article 7 and Protocol 35 to the EEA Agreement.6 4
The primacy of EEA law is limited only by the fundamental principles and core content of fundamental rights laid down in the
Constitution and in the European Human Rights Convention.6 5
Accordingly, the Supreme Administrative Court of Liechtenstein
sees no difficulty in setting aside provisions of national law that
conflict with EEA law. In the alternative, the Court would try to
give the national rule in question an EEA-friendly interpretation.
In either case, the Supreme Administrative Court will not wait
until the provision has been amended or abolished either by the
59. See Hoyesteretts internettsider, Summary of Recent Supreme Court Decisions,
available at http://www.hoyesterett.no/1270.asp (last visited Mar. 10, 2005) (discussing
the Norwegian Supreme Court's decisions in Finanger,Case 55/1999, HR-2000-00049B
(2000) and Paranova,Case 2002/582, HR-2004-00981-A (2004)).
60. See id.
61. SeeJudgment of Dec. 16, 1999, Sveinbj6rnsd6ttir, Case No. 236/1999 (Sup. Ct.
of Iceland); see also Thorgeir Orlygsson, Hvernig hefur island brugdist vi@ dkvrDunum
EFTA-d6mst6sins?, TfMARIT LOGFReD1NGA (2004); Graver, supra note 41.

62. See Andreas Batliner, Die Anwendung des EWR-Rechts durch liechtensteinische Gerichte -

Erfahrungen eines Richters, LIECHTENSTEINISCHE JURISTENZEITUNG (forthcoming

Winter 2004).
63. See Expert Opinion of the State Court 1995/14, LES 122 (1996).
64. SeeJugement de la Cour d'lttat de la Principaut6 du Liechtenstein en tant que
Cour constitutionnelle, StGH 1998/60, SchZB1. 585 (1999).
65. See id.
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legislature or the State Court.
In the Sveinbjdrnsdtttircase, the referring District Court of
Reykjavfk granted the plaintiff compensation.6 7 The Supreme
Court of Iceland confirmed that ruling upon appeal. 68 The Supreme Court emphasized that, under the Icelandic Constitution,
it had to assess independently whether State liability had a legal
basis in domestic law.69 Nonetheless, it also held that the EEA
Agreement provided a legal basis for State liability and found it
natural to interpret the act that incorporated the EEA Agreement into Icelandic law such that an individual may claim that
the Icelandic law may be harmonized with the EEA rules.7 " The
Supreme Court held that the Icelandic State was in material
breach of its obligation to guarantee Ms. Sveinbj6rnsd6ttir payment from the wage guarantee fund.7 '
In other cases, the Supreme Court-of Iceland, although officially advocating dualism, found a way to implement EFTA Court
rulings.7 2 The question of what effects EEA secondary law produces in the national orders of EEA/EFTA States arose in 1999
in the Storebrand Skadeforsikring AS v. Veronika Finanger case.7"
Veronika Finanger, a passenger in a car, was severely injured in a

traffic accident."

The cause of the accident was the reduced

driving ability of the driver who was under the influence of alcohol.7 5 As a result, Ms. Finanger was left 60% medically disabled
and 100% occupationally disabled.7 6 The third-party motor vehicle liability insurance was with Storebrand Skadeforsikring AS.
Ms. Finanger sued Storebrand, seeking compensation for the
personal injuries she suffered in the accident.7 7 Storebrand rejected Ms. Finanger's claim, referring to a provision of the Norwegian Automobile Liability Act which stated that, absent special
66. See Batliner, supra note 62.
67. The Sveinbj6msd6ttirjudgment of the District Court of Reykjavfk has not been
published. It is only referred to in the judgment of the Supreme Court. SeeJudgment
of Dec. 16, 1999, Sveinbj6rnsd6ttir, Case No. 236/1999 (Sup. Ct. of Iceland).
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See Orlygsson, supra note 61.
73. Case E-1/99, [1999] Rep. EFTA Ct. 119, 131,
36.
74. See id. 2.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See id.
2-3.
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circumstances, a passenger injured in a traffic accident may not
obtain compensation if he or she knew or should have known
that the driver of the vehicle was under the influence of alcohol
at the time of the accident.7" The Supreme Court of Norway
referred to the EFTA Court the question of whether that provision was incompatible with the EEA Motor Vehicle Insurance Directives.7 9 The EFTA Court held that this was indeed the case. 80
The Norwegian Supreme Court did not ask the EFTA Court to
answer what effect a provision of a directive may produce in the
internal legal order of an EEA/EFTA State. The Court, therefore, did not address that issue in its opinion. The Supreme
Court of Norway, basing its ruling on the EFTA Court's judgment, unanimously held that the provision in the Norwegian Automobile Liability Act violated EEA law.8 ' The Court also stated
that the duty to loyally cooperate contained in EEA Article 3
(the provision mirroring EC Article 10) is applicable to courts.8 2
There was, however, dissent on how to resolve the contradiction
between EEA law and domestic law. A majority of ten justices
found that the clear wording of the national provision in question could not be set aside.8 3 A minority of five justices, including the Chief Justice, concluded that EEA law must take precedence, and thus the Norwegian provision in question was not
applicable. 4 As a result, Storebrand was not held liable for
Finanger's compensation claim.8 5 It is notable that the case did
not center on the vertical relationship between a State and a private citizen, but rather the horizontal relationship between a
consumer and an insurance company, a circumstance that was
widely discussed by the Court's majority. One of Norway's lead78. See id. 4.
79. See Council Directive No. 72/166, O.J. L 103 (1972); Council Directive No. 84/
5, .J. L 8 (1984); Council Directive No. 90/232, .J. L 129 (1990); see also EEA Agreement, supra note 4, Annex IX, at 8-10, O.J. L 1/3.
80. Storebrand Skadeforsikring, Case E-1/99, [1999] Rep. EFTA Ct. at
28.
81. See Hoyesteretts internettsider, supra note 59 (providing an internet link to a
summary of the Norwegian Supreme Court's decisions in Finanger,Case 55/1999, HR2000-00049B (2000)).
82. For the significance of Article 10 of the EC Treaty, the provision mirroring
Article 3 of the EEA, in Community law, see John Temple Lang, The Duties of National
Courts Under Community ConstitutionalLaw, 22 EUR. L. REv. 3 (1997).
83. See Hoyesteretts internettsider, supra note 59 (summarizing Norwegian Supreme Court's decisions in Finanger,Case 55/1999, HR-2000-00049B (2000)).
84. See id.
85. See id.
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ing scholars has opined that, in a vertical context, the Supreme
Court would 6have concluded that a provision of a directive
8
would apply.
Subsequently, Ms. Finanger instituted legal proceedings
against the Norwegian government and claimed damages for
failure to correctly implement EEA law.8 7 The Oslo City Court,
8
in a March 13, 2003 judgment, found in favor of Ms. Finanger.
The Court based its decision on the EFTA Court's State liability
jurisprudence, and also referred to the Icelandic Supreme
Court's ruling in the Sveinbjdtsdtttir case.89
III. THE DIALOGUES BETWEEN THE EFTA COURT AND THE
COMMUNITY COURTS
A. Community Courts InterpretingEC Law

The EF-TA Court has acted as a conceptual pioneer for
Community courts in fields such as: television without frontiers;
labor law including equal rights; the law of parallel trade and of
repackaging; State aid law; and, in particular, food safety law. In
the respective cases, a number of courts have made explicit reference to EFTA Court case law. Advocates-General of the ECJ
have played an important part in this dialogue. °° Recently the
EFTA Court has, for its part, referred to opinions of AdvocatesGeneral.9 1 For the sake of completeness, it may be added that
86. See Graver, supra note 41.
87. SeeJudgment of March 13, 2003, Case No. 02-10919 A/83 (Oslo City Court)
(not published).
88. See id.
89. See id. The case has been appealed by the Norwegian Government. See Linda
Helland, The Application of the State Liability Doctrine in the EEA, 6 EUR. L. REP. 234 (2003).
90. For details see the discussion of the respective cases infra, notes 136, 143-48,
170-71 and accompanying text.
91. See Landsorganisasjonen I Norge (Norwegian federation of Trade Unions)
with Norsk Kommuneforbund (Norwegian Union of Municial Employees) v. Kommunenes Sentralforbund (Norwegian Assoc. of Local and Regional Author), Case E-8/
00, [2002] Rep. EFTA Ct. 116, 129,
35 (referring to Opinion of Advocate-General
Jacobs, Albany Int'l BV v. Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie, Case C-67/
96, [1999] E.C.R. I--, Opinion of Advocate-General Jacobs, Brentjens' Handelsonderneming BV v. Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds voor de Handel in Bouwmaterialen,
Joined Cases C-115/97 & C-117/97, [1999] E.C.R. I-_, and Opinion of Advocate-General Jacobs, Maatschappij Drijvende Bokken BV v. Stichting Pensioenfonds voor de
Vervoer- en Havenbedrijven, Case C-219/97, [1999] E.C.R. 1-5751,
109, [2000] 4
C.M.L.R. 446); EFTA Surveillance Auth. v. The Kingdom of Norway, Case E-1/02,
[2003] Rep. EFTA Ct. 1, J 37, 40 (referring to Opinion of Advocate-General Tesauro,
Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen, Case C-450/93, [1995] E.C.R. 1-3051, [1996] 1

2005]

THE EVFA COURT

the Commission of the European Communities which is submitting observations in all EFTA Court cases has on occasion played
92
a key role in establishing EEA inter-court dialogue.
In the joined cases of Forbrukerombudet v. Mattel Scandinavia
A/S & Lego Norge A/S ("Mattel/Lego"), the EFTA Court, upon referral from the Norwegian Market Council, held in a June 16,
1995 judgment that Articles 2(2) and 16 of Television Directive
89/552 must be interpreted as preventing an EEA State from
applying a nationwide general ban on television advertising specifically aimed at children if the advertisements are part of a television program that is received from another EEA State.9 3 At the
same time, a portion of the Court's dicta based on the seventeenth recital of the Television Directive's preamble that the Television Directive was not meant to preclude Member States from
taking measures under Directive 84/450 with regard to advertisements deemed misleading within the meaning of that Directive.9 4 The ECJ followed the EFTA Court's line of reasoning in
its July 9, 1997 ruling in the joined cases Konsumentenombudsmannen v. De Agostini (Svenska) FrlagAB and Konsumentenombudsmannen v. TV-shop i Sverige AB, which had originally been referred to
the EFTA Court. After Sweden's accession to the E.U., the Market Court withdrew the its requests and, on March 7, 1995, referred them to the ECJ.9 5 One will notice that AG Jacobs proposed that the ECJ follow the holding, but not the dicta, of the
EFTA Court in Mattel/Lego. 6
C.M.L.R. 175, and Opinion of Advocate-General Saggio, Badeck & Others, interveners:
Hessische Ministerprfsident and Landesanwalt beim Staatsgerichtshof des Landes Hessen, Case C-158/97, [2000] E.C.R. 1-1875, [2001] 2 C.M.L.R. 6); Technologien Bauund Wirtschaftsberatung GmbH and Bellona Found. v. EFTA Surveillance Auth., Case
E-2/02, [2003] Rep. EFTA Ct. 52, 37 (referring to the Opinion of Advocate-General
Jacobs, Union de Pequefios Agricultores v. Council, C-50/00, [2002] E.C.R. 1-6677,
[2003] 3 C.M.L.R. 1);Judgment of November 23, 2004, Fokus Bank ASA v. The Norwegian State, represented by Skattedirektoratet (the Directorate of Taxes), Case E-1/04,
23 (not yet reported) (referring to Opinion of Advocate-General Geelhoed, Ospelt v.
Schl6ssle Weissenberg Familienstiftung, Case C-452/01, [2003] E.C.R. 1-9743).
92. See CARL BAUDENBACHER, THE EFTA COURT TEN YE.ARS ON (forthcoming, on
file with author).
93. Joined Cases E-8/94 & E-9/94, [1994-19951 Rep. EFTA Ct. 113, 127,
57.
94. See id. 55.
95. See Konsumentenombudsmannen v. De Agostini (Svenska) F6rlag AB, Case C34/95, and Konsumentenombudsmannen v. TV-shop i Sverige AB, Cases C-35/95 & C36/95, [1997] E.C.R. 1-3843, [1998] 1 C.M.L.R. 32.
96. See Opinion of Advocate-General Jacobs, Konsumentombudsmannen, Case C-34/
95, and TV-shop, Cases C-35/95 & C-36/95, [1997] E.C.R. 3843 at
85.
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In TV 1000 Sverige AB v. Norweigian Gov't ("TV 100(7'), the
EFTA Court found that there is no common standard of pornography for the EEA, and held that program broadcasts which
might seriously impair the physical, mental, or moral development of minors are not lawful because they are sent at night or
because there is a technical device.9 7 In R v. Secretary of Statefor
Culture, Media and Sport, the U.K. Government, after having informed the Commission and the broadcaster that in its view the
broadcasting of pornographic movies from Denmark to the
United Kingdom manifestly, seriously, and gravely infringed Article 22 of Directive 89/552, prohibited the broadcast and informed the Commission, which by a decision addressed to the
United Kingdom stated that the measure was not discriminatory
and was appropriate for the purpose of protecting minors.9 8
The High Court dismissed an application by Danish Satellite TV
("DSTV") against the order of the U.K. Government referring to
EFTA Court TV 1000. 9 The judge also rejected DSTV's alternative request for a question to be referred to the ECJ under the
EC Article 234 procedure stating that the judgment was unequivocal.' 0 0 Moreover, the High Court refused DSTV leave to appeal
to the Court of Appeal as DSTV's application for leave to appeal
was dismissed.' 0 1 An action for annulment by DSTV against the
Commission was dismissed as inadmissible by the CFI under
230(4) EC.

10 2

The preliminary reference series of Eidesund v. Stavanger CateringA/S, 0' 3 Langeland v. Norske FabricomA/S,10 4 Ulstein & Roiseng
v. Moller,1 5 and Ask & Others v. ABB Offshore Technology AS & Aker
Offshore PartnerAS.° 6 was primarily concerned with the question
of whether the Directive on Transfers of Undertakings was applicable to the replacement of independent service providers, i.e.,
the termination of a contract with one service provider followed
97. Case E-8/97, [1998] Rep. EFTA Ct. 70, 77,
24.
98. Danish Satellite TV A/S (Eurotica Rendez-vous Television) v. Commission,
Case T-69/99, [2000] E.C.R. 11-4039, 7 5, 10.
99. See id. 13.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See id. It 30-32.
103. Case E-2/95, [1995-96] Rep. EFTA Ct. 3.
104. Case E-3/95, [1995-96] Rep. EFTA Ct. 38.
105. Case E-2/96, [1995-96] Rep. EFTA Ct. 67.
106. Case E-3/96, [1997] Rep. EFTA Ct. 3.
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by the entering into a contract with a new, more competitive
company. In the wake of the ECJ's affirmation in Christel Schmidt
v. Spar- und Leihkasse der friiheren Amter Bordesholm, Kiel und Cronshagen of the Directive's applicability in cases concerning the
mere outsourcing of an activity,"' 7 this question had become a
bone of contention, particularly in Germany and the United
08
the operator of an oil drilling platform
Kingdom. In Eidesund,1
in the North Sea terminated a contract relating to the provision
of catering and cleaning services by an independent company,
invited tenders, and based on those tenders, awarded a contract
to another company.1 °9 After obtaining the contract, the successful employer offered fourteen of the former contractor's
nineteen employees continued work on the platform.1 10 No
contractual relations existed between the former service provider and the successor, and tangible assets were taken over to a
The EFT7A Court found that the supply of
very limited extent.'
services and goods alone did not constitute part of a service provider's business within the meaning of the Directive. 2 Accordingly, the loss of one customer to a competing company would
normally not qualify as a transfer of a business within the meaning of the Directive.' 1 3 Nonetheless, the EFTA Court concluded
that the replacement of an independent service provider with
another might constitute a transfer of business within the meaning of the Directive, depending on the circumstances of the individual case.1 14 The EFTA Court changed its approach in Ulstein
& Roiseng.li5 In that case, an outside company that carried out
ambulance services for a hospital was no longer considered after
public tenders had been invited, but replaced by a second company."' No tangible assets were taken over.' 1 7 The second company invited potential candidates to send in applications, but
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Case C-392/92, [1994] E.C.R. 1-1311, [1995) 2 C.M.L.R. 331.
6.
Case E-2/95, [1995-96] Rep. EFTA Ct. 3, 6,
See id. 1 5.
See id.
See id. 77 30, 32.
See id. 35.
See id. 36.
See id. 7 38, 46.
Case E-2/96, [1995-96] Rep. EFTA Ct. 67.
See id. 12.
See id. 7 13.
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reemployed only a limited number of the original employees. 1 18
In its ruling, the EFTA Court held that "a mere succession of two
contracts for the provision of the same or similar services will
not, as a rule, be sufficient for there to be a transfer of an undertaking, business or part of a business" within the meaning of the
Directive.11 9 The EFTA Court confirmed this jurisprudence in
the Ask & Others case.' 2 ° In Siizen v. Zehnacker Gebiudereinigung
GmbH Krankenhausservice" ' the ECJ did not qualify the replacement of a service provider as falling within the scope of the
Transfer of Undertakings Directive, making reference to the
EFTA Court's ruling in Ulstein & Roiseng.'2 2 In Adi (U.K) Limited
v. Firm Security Group Ltd., a case on succession of contracts, the
Court of Appeals based itself on the ECJ's Siizen judgment and
indirectly referred to the Ulstein & Roiseng case by quoting verbatim the paragraph in which the ECJ cites that EFTA Court ruling.1 23 The Austrian Supreme Court interpreted the notion of
transfer by reference to EFTA Court Ulstein & Roiseng.124 The
question was whether the transfer rules would also apply if the
worker is an apprentice. The Supreme Court answered in the
affirmative.
In the Eidesund, Ulstein & Roiseng, and Ask & Others cases,
the EFJA Court also found that the Transfer of Undertakings
Directive was applicable where, in the event of succession of contracts, the new contract was awarded after a public tender had
taken place. 125 However, the Court expressed its reservation that
in most cases of public tendering, regardless of whether it was
stipulated by EEA law or not, the replacement of a service provider would not constitute a transfer of an undertaking, business,
or part of a business within the meaning of the Transfer of Undertakings Directive. 1 26 The ECJ followed EFTA Court cases,
118. See id.
119. See id. 1 27.
120. Case E-3/96, [1997] Rep. EFTA Ct. 3, 8, 9 19.
121. Case C-13/95, [1997] E.C.R. 1-1259.
122. See id. 1 10.
123. [2001] 3 C.M.L.R. 8,
15, 25 (Eng. C.A.).
124. See Osman P. v. Gunther D., Ges.mbH, 9 ObA 193/98t, 269 (Aus.).
125. See Eidesund v. Stavanger Catering A/S, Case E-2/95, [1995-96] Rep. EFTA
Ct. 3, 14, 1 48; Ulstein & Roiseng v. Moller, Case E-2/96, [1995-96] Rep. EFTA Ct. 67,
76,
44, Ask & Others, [1997] Rep. EFTA Ct. 9 33.
126. Eidesund, [1995-96] Rep. EFTA Ct.
46; U/stein & Riseng, [1995-96] Rep.
EFTA Ct. 27, Ask & Others, [1997] Rep. EFTA Ct. 1 19.
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Eidesund and Ask v. ABB & Aker in Oy Liikenne Ab v. Pekka Liskojdrui & PenttiJuntunen,holding that a public
tender does not
1 27
exclude the applicability of the Directive.
In the cases Eidesund and Langeland, the national courts also
asked whether an obligation of the transferor of a business or of
part of a business to pay premiums into a supplementary pension scheme would be transferred to the purchaser. 1 28 The
Court found that the Directive exempted all the rights and obli1 29
gations regarding old-age, invalidity, and survivors' benefits.
It noted that the accrual of pension benefits and the payment of
pension premiums were inseparable and that it made no economic sense to transfer the obligation to pay premiums once it
was clear that there was no obligation to pay pensions.' ° The
England and Wales Court of Appeal held in the Adams v. Lancashire CC & BET CateringServ. Ltd. case,' that Article 3(3) of the
Transfer of Undertakings Directive exempts all the rights concerning sup' lementary pension schemes in case of old-age, invalidity, and survivors' benefits from the transfer. It referred, inter
alia, to EFTA Court Eidesund holding that this ruling was not
binding, but constituted "persuasive authority."1 3 2 The House of
Lords denied appeal. 13' The Employment Appeal Tribunal
came to the same conclusion in Franklingv. BPS Public Sector Ltd.
34
and referred to the EFTA Court's Eidesund ruling.'
In the case Briheche v. Minist're de lintrieur,AG Poiares Maduro proposed that the ECJ hold that the Equal Rights Directive
76/207 and EC Article 141(4) preclude national legislation that
discriminates between widowers and widows who have not remarried as regards the age limit imposed on them for access to
posts in the administration, without being aimed either at removing existing inequalities or at compensating them.1 35 The
127. [2001] E.C.R. 1-745 44.
128. See Eidesund, [1995-96] Rep. EFTA Ct. 3; Langeland v. Norske Fabricom A/
S, Case E-3/95, [1995-96] Rep. EFTA Ct. 3.
129. See Eidesund, [1995-96] Rep. EFTA Ct. 60; Langeland, [1995-96] Rep. EFTA
Ct. 1 32.
130. See Eidesund, [1995-96] Rep. EFrA Ct. 66; Langeland, [1995-96] Rep. EFTA
Ct. 1 38.
131. [1997] 3 C.M.L.R. 79 (Eng. C.A.).
132. See id. at 92.
133. See id.
134. [1999] I.C.R. 347, [1999] I.R.L.R. 212.
135. Case 319/03, [2004] E.C.R. -,
53.
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AG emphasized that positive measures, i.e. measures that favor
women in order to reduce their under representation in professional life, must be reconciled with the equal treatment principle
and referred, inter alia, to the EFTA Court's judgment in the
EFFA Surveillance Auth. v. The Kingdom of Norway ("University of
Oslo") case."3 6 In University of Oslo, the EFTA Court held that the
"earmarking" of academic posts for women was contrary to the
1 7
principle of equal treatment.
In Mag Instrument Inc. v. Cal. Trading Co. Norway, Ulsteen
("Maglit'),138 a Norwegian business had directly imported trademarked Maglite flashlights from California to Norway without
the trademark owner's consent. According to Article 7(1) of the
Trade Mark Directive, "the trade mark shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit its use in relation to goods which have been
put on the market in a Member State under that trademark by
the proprietor or with his consent." '
The EFTA Court held in
a ruling on December 3, 1997, that this provision is to be interpreted as leaving it up to the EFFA States which are parties to
the EEA Agreement to decide whether they wish to introduce or
maintain the principle of international exhaustion of rights conferred by a trademark with regard to goods originating from
outside the EEA 14 ° The Court found that the principle of international exhaustion is in the interest of free trade and competition and thus in the interest of consumers, that it is in line with
the main function of a trademark to allow consumers to identify
with certainty the origin of the goods, and that this interpretation of Article 7(1) of the Trade Mark Directive was also consistent with the TRIPs Agreement, which left the issue open for the
Member States to regulate.' 41 In its Silhouette Int'l Schmied GmbH
& Co. KG v. HarlauerHandelsgesellschaftmbHjudgment of July 16,
1998, the ECJ came to the opposite conclusion, holding that national rules of EC Member States providing for international exhaustion of trademark rights were incompatible with Article 7(1)
136. See EFTA Surveillance Auth. v. The Kingdom of Norway, Case E-1/02, [2003]
Rep. EFTA Ct. 3.
137. See id. 59.
138. Case E-2/97, [1997] Rep. EFFA Ct. 127.
139. See id. 2.
140. See id. 28.
141. See id.
19-20.
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of the Trade Mark Directive. 14 2 The ruling was essentially based
on the consideration that this result comports with the goal of
securing the functioning of the internal market. The ECJ did
not make reference to the EFTA Court's Maglite judgment, but
AGJacobs did. 4 3 He distinguished the two cases on the facts (in
Maglite, unlike in Silhouette, the parallel imports stemmed from
the United States, i.e. from outside the EEA) and on the law
(unlike the EC Treaty, the EEA Agreement has not established a
customs union, but rather a free trade area in which sovereignty
in foreign trade matters lies with the contracting parties)144 AG
Jacobs moreover found the argument advanced in Silhouette by
the Swedish government that the function of trademarks is not
to enable the trademark owner to divide up the market and to
exploit price differentials and that the adoption of international
exhaustion would bring substantial advantages to consumers,
14 5
and would promote price competition, "extremely attractive."
One will notice that this approach also underlies the EFTA
Court's Maglite ruling. 46 However, the AG concluded that the
ECJ's case law on the function of trademarks was developed in
the context of the Community, not the world market, and to allow Member States to opt for international exhaustion would itself result in barriers between Member States. 1 4 7 It is not for the
President of the EFTA Court to comment on the ECJ's Silhouette
judgment. It is doubtful, however, that the actual legal situation
constitutes a contribution to making Europe "the most competitive and dynamic economy in the world" in this decade.1 4 ' For
the sake of order, it may be added that in the Zino DavidoffSA v.
A & G Imports Ltd., Levi Strauss & Co. & Others v. Tesco Stores Ltd.
& Others, and Levi Strauss & Co. & Others v. Costco Wholesale UK
Ltd. joined cases, which in the meantime has led to a judgment
by the ECJ,149 the Chancery Division referred in its decision to
142. Case C-355/96, [1998] E.C.R. 1-4799, [1998] 2 C.M.L.R. 953.
143. See Opinion of Advocate-General Jacobs, Silhouette, [1998] E.C.R. 1-4799, 43.
144. See id.
145. Id. 49.
146. Mag Instrument Inc. v. Cal. Trading Co. Norway, Ulsteen, [1997] Rep. EFTA
Ct.
19.
147. See Opinion of Advocate-General Jacobs, Silhouette, [1998] E.C.R. 1-4799, 43.
148. Remarks by the European Council at the EU Feira Summit in Lisbon, March
2001 available at http://www.weforum.org/pdf/Gcr/LisbonReview/LisbonReview2002.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2005).
149. Joined Cases C-414/99, C-415/99, and C-416/99, [2001] E.C.R. 1-8691; see also
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ask the ECJ for a preliminary ruling, inter alia, to the EFTA
Court's Maglitejudgment.5 '
In Merck & Co., Inc. & Others v. ParanovaAS ("Paranov"'),151
the U.S. pharmaceutical manufacturer Merck brought a lawsuit
against the Danish parallel importer Paranova. Paranova repackaged the original products and reaffixed Merck's trademark
onto the repackaging as well as information on the identity of
the repackager. 15 2 Moreover, along the edges of the repackaging, it affixed vertical or horizontal stripes, whose colors would
vary in accordance with those employed by the original producer. The action brought by Merck against Paranova before
the Norwegian courts aimed at prohibiting the use of those
colored stripes.1 5 3 The Norwegian Supreme Court asked the
EFTA Court whether, in a case where it has been established that
repackaging of a pharmaceutical product was necessary to allow
a parallel importer effective access to the market, "legitimate reasons" within the meaning of Article 7(2) of the Directive existed
on the grounds that the parallel importer has equipped the new
packaging with colored stripes, and whether the use of such
packaging design should be measured against a "necessity test,"
along the lines developed in the case law of the Court of Justice
of the European Communities. 1 4 The EFFA Court emphasized
the importance of free trade in markets partitioned along national boundaries, such as the pharmaceutical market.1 55 In recognition of their contribution to overcoming this partition, certain privileges are conferred on parallel importers. Once the
right to repackage and to reaffix the original trademark is established and market access is thereby ensured, the parallel importer is to be considered as an operator on basically equal footCarl Baudenbacher, InternationaleErschrpfung des Markenrechts und der Begiff der Zustimmung, EUR. L. REP. 2001, 382 et. seq.
150. See ADI v. Willer, [2001] 3 C.M.L.R. 8, [2001] I.R.L.R. 542. For the sake of
completeness, the judgment of the Zurich Commercial Court in the Kodak case may be
mentioned. In this case the Commercial Court found by four to one vote that patent
rights were subject to international exhaustion. The Court referred, inter alia, to EFTA
Court Maglite. See Kodak SA v. Jumbo-Markt AG,ZR 1998 Nr. 112. Upon appeal by the
patent owner, the judgment was overruled by the Swiss Federal Supreme Court in a
three to two decision. See Kodak SA v. Jumbo-Markt AG, BGE 126 III 129.
151. Case E-3/02, [2003] Rep. EFTA Ct. 101.
152. See id. 3.
153. See id.
8-9.
154. See id. 16.
155. See id.
34-37.
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ing with the manufacturer and trademark proprietor within the
framework of the Trade Mark Directive. 5 6 Consequently, its
strategy of product presentation and the new design cannot
mechanically be assessed on the basis of the necessity criterion.
Instead, the EFTA Court found, a comprehensive balancing of
the interests of the trademark proprietor and the parallel importer must be undertaken. 15 7 In doing so, the national court
must take into account whether the packaging design used by
Paranova is liable to damage the reputation of Merck's trademark, whether the trademark is used in a way that may give rise
to the impression that there is a commercial connection between Paranova and Merck, and whether the marketing of
Merck's products under the same trademark by various parallel
importers with various package designs would evoke the risk of
degeneration of the mark.1 58 If this were the case, the EFTA
Court concluded, the trademark owner would have "legitimate
reasons" within the meaning of Article 7(2) of the Trade Mark
Directive to oppose Paranova's use of colored stripes. 159 The
EFTA Court's ruling in Paranova prompted the England and
Wales Court of Appeal in Boehringer Ingelheim KG v. Swingward
Ltd. to refer to the ECJ the question of whether the use of its
own design elements (referred to as "co-branding") by a parallel
importer and repackager of pharmaceuticals is in line with the
Directive provisions on the exhaustion principle and the ECJ's
case law related thereto, in particular the "necessity test." 6 ° The
Court of Appeal emphasized that with regard to this question,
there appear to be two schools of thought in European justice.1 61
Whereas the EFTA Court's jurisprudence shows a positive approach towards the parallel importer creating a package design
of its own, the Supreme Courts of Austria, Denmark, and Germany, as well as the Court of Appeal of Sweden, apply a strict
necessity test and tend to prohibit conduct such as Paranova's in
the EIFTA Court's judgment. 6 2 One will notice in this context
that the EFTA Court itself has mentioned the case law of the
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

See id. 45.
See id. 34.
See id. 11 40-56.
See id. 53.
[2004] 3 C.M.L.R. 3 (Eng. C.A.).
See id. 86.
See id.
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1 63
Danish Supreme Court in its Paranovajudgment.
In Norwegian Bankers Assoc. v. EFTA Surveillance Auth. ("Husbanken fI'J),164 the EFTA Surveillance Authority, upon a complaint by the Norwegian Bankers' Association, found that the
State guarantee for Husbanken, the Norwegian State Housing
Bank, amounted to State aid within the meaning of EEA Article
61(1), the provision mirroring EC Article 87(1), but that it was
essentially justified under EEA Article 59(2), the provision mirroring Article 86(2) EC as constituting an operation of services
of general economic interest.165 The Norwegian Bankers' Association brought an action for annulment of that decision under
Surveillance and Court Agreement Article 36.166 The EFTA
Court held that an institution performing the tasks of Husbanken may be considered as an undertaking entrusted with the
operation of a service of general economic interest within the
meaning of that provision and that the aid in question was necessary for Husbanken to perform the tasks entrusted to it. 1 6 7 However, the Court annulled the decision of E.S.A. on the grounds
that the latter had not considered the following points to the
extent necessary: the definition of the relevant market; the question of whether there were alternative means less distortive of
competition; the issue of a cost-benefit analysis; and the application of a proportionality test.'66 E.S.A. had thereby wrongly interpreted EEA Article 59(2). The Court confirmed in State Debt
Mgmt. Agency v. Islandsbanki-FBA that "a [S] tate guarantee system
for a publicly owned bank may constitute [S] tate aid within the
meaning of Article 61 E.E.A.' 1 69 At the same time, it found that
a national court does not have the competence to declare that
State aid granted by an EFTA State is contrary to the EEA Agreement.1 7 0 In Ministre de l'economie v. GEMO SA, AG Jacobs mentioned the EFTA Court's Husbanken I!judgment as a reference

163. Merck & Co., Inc. & Others v. Paranova AS, Case E-3/02, [2003] Rep. EFTA
Ct. at 1 19.
164. Case E-4/97, [1999] Rep. EFrA Ct. 1.
165. See id. 11 9-10.
166. See id. 11.
167. See id. 67.
168. See id. 11 69-70.
169. State Debt Management Agency v. Islandsbanki-FBA, Case E-1/00, [20002001] Rep. EFTA Ct. 10, 26,
37.
170. See Opinion ofAdvocate-Generaljacobs, Ministre de l'economie v. GEMO SA,
Case C-126/01, [2002] E.C.R. -,
50.
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for the so-called "[S] tate aid approach" with regard to whether
financial compensation granted by a Member State to an undertaking providing a public service should be regarded as State
aid. 7 The question was and partly still is one of the most controversial in EC State aid law and has recently been answered by
the ECJ in cases Ferring SA v. Agence Central des Organismes de
Sicuritg Sociale and Altmark Trans GmbH & Regierungsprasidium
Magdeburgv. Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH conversely, i.e.,
' 17 2
in favor of the so-called "compensation approach."
In Government of Norway v. FFTA Surveillance Auth., 7 3 the
EFTA Court dismissed an application brought by Norway for the
annulment of a decision of E.S.A. regarding State aid in the
form of regionally differentiated social security taxation in Norway.1 74 The National Insurance Act of February 28, 1997, provided for an insurance scheme under which employees and employers pay social security contributions.1 7 5 The contribution
rates for employers, ranging from 0 to 14.1%, were calculated on
the basis of the individual employee's gross salary income, with
the contribution rate depending on which of five designated
zones the employee had his or her registered permanent residence. 176 The highest rate was payable in central municipalities
in southern Norway and a zero rate applied in certain areas in
northern Norway. 1 7 7 Following an investigation, ESA adopted
the contested decision, finding that the scheme involved State
aid in breach of EEA Article 61 (1).178 ESA found that a general
exemption was not warranted but that parts of the aid might,
subject to certain conditions, be exempted under EEA Article
61(3) (c).179 The EFTA Court held the contribution system to be
selective, favoring certain undertakings, and thus constituting
171. See id. at n.64, 77.
172. See Ferring SA v. Agence Central des Organismes de Scurit6 Sociale, Case C53/00, [2001] E.C.R. 1-9067, [2003] 1 C.M.L.R. 34.; Altmark Trans GmbH & Regierungsprasidiurn Magdeburg v. Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH, Case C-280/00,
[2003] E.C.R. 1-7747, [2003] C.M.L.R. 12; Transportbedriftenes Landsforening and
Nor-Way Bussekspress AS v. EFTA Surveillance Auth., Case E-3/03, available at http://
www.EFTAcourt.lu/pdf/E-3_03Decision.pdf (withdrawn) (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
173. Case E-6/98, [1999] Rep. EFTA Ct. 74.
174. See id. 43.
175. See id. 1.
176. See id. 2.
177. See id.
178. See id. 91 64-67.
179. See id. 16.
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State aid within the meaning of EEA Article 61(1).18' The argument that it constituted a general measure falling outside the
scope of that provision was rejected. Whereas, as a general rule,
a tax system of an EEA/EFTA State was not deemed to be covered by the EEA Agreement, such a system may have consequences that would bring it within the scope of application of
EEA Article 61(1).181 In Salzgitter AG v. Commission,'8 2 the CFI
inter alia,had to answer the question of whether the Commission
had wrongly classified the tax provisions of Paragraph three of
the German law on the development of the border zone between the former German Democratic Republic and the former
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (Zonenrandfdrderungsgesetz,
"ZRFG").
The provision provided for tax incentives in the
form of special depreciation allowances and tax-free reserves for
investments made in any establishment of an undertaking situated along the border area between the former German Democratic Republic and the former Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.18 4 The Commission found that these privileges constituted
State aid within the meaning of the ECSC Treaty.18 5 The CFI
rejected Salzgitter's plea that the tax provisions in question constitute general tax provisions.18 6 It noted that Paragraph three
of the ZRFG applied without distinction to all sectors of activity,
all types of investments, and all undertakings regardless of size,
sector of activity, or seat. 18 7 The advantage conferred by the
measures was, however, subject to the condition that the investments were made in the zone in question, i.e. in a geographically
limited area within a Member State. 188 In the CFI's view, that
was sufficient for the measures to be viewed as relating to a specific category of undertakings. 89 The CFI concluded that it
does not matter that the selective nature of the measure flows
from a sectoral criterion or, as on the case at hand,
from a criterion relating to geographic location in a defined
180.
181.
182.
183.
184,
185,
186.
187,
188.
189.

See id. 38.
See id. 34.
Case T-308/00, [2004] E.C.R..
See id. 22.
See id.
See id. 11.
See id. 43.
See id. 35.
See id. 36.
See id. 37.
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part of the territory of a Member State. What matters, however, for a measure to be found to be State aid, is that the
recipient undertakings belong to a specific category determined by the application, in law or in fact, of the criterion
established by the measure in question (see, to that effect,
Case E-6/98 Norway v. EFTA Surveillance Authority [1999]
EFTA Court Report 74, paragraph 37).190

In its 1983 Officier van Justitie v. Sandoz judgment, the ECJ
held that the Member States must give marketing permission for
fortified foodstuffs, if the addition of vitamins will satisfy a real
need, in particular, of technological or nutritional nature. At
the same time, the ECJ found that a national regulation according to which the marketing approval for foodstuffs fortified with
vitamins which have been lawfully put on the market in other
Member States depends on whether the importer shows that
there is a need on the market is incompatible with Community
law.19 1 In EFTA Surveillance Authority v. Norway ("Kellogg
Case"),192 Norway banned the import and marketing of Kellogg's cornflakes fortified with vitamins and iron which had been
lawfully manufactured and marketed in other EEA States. The
EFTA Court rejected the argument of the Norwegian government that in order to justify a marketing ban on cornflakes produced in Denmark it was sufficient to show the absence of a nutritional need for the fortification with vitamins and iron in the
Norwegian population.1 93 The question of need with regard to
additives to foodstuffs may have a proper place in the context of
the proportionality test.19 4 At the same time, the EFTA Court
found that in examining whether the marketing of fortified
cornflakes may be banned on grounds of the protection of
human health, a national government may, in the absence of
harmonization, invoke the "precautionary principle. ' 9 5 According to the "precautionary principle," it is sufficient to show that
there is relevant scientific uncertainty with regard to the risk in
question. 9 6 The Court stressed that measures taken "must be
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id. 38.
See Officier van Justitie v. Sandoz, Case C-174/82, [1983] E.C.R. 2445,
Case E-3/00, [2001-2002] Rep. EFTA Ct. 73.
See id.
23, 38.
See id. 28.
See id.
30-33.
See id. 31.

24.
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based on scientific evidence; they must be proportionate, nondiscriminatory, transparent, and consistent with similar measures already taken."19 7 In the view of the Court, the conditions
to be fulfilled by a proper application of the precautionary principle were, first, an identification of potentially negative health
consequences, and second, a comprehensive evaluation of the
risk to health, which must be based on the most recent scientific
information. 9 ' The EFTA Court added that the precautionary
principle can never justify the adoption of arbitrary decisions
and can justify the pursuit of the objective of "zero risk" only in
the most exceptional circumstances.' 9 9 The Norwegian fortification policy did not fulfill these requirements. It was particularly
inconsistent due to the long-standing fortification of certain
products initiated by the government, and therefore, held to be
contrary to EEA Article 11.20 The EFTA Court's Kellogg Case
judgment had a considerable impact on the case law of the ECJ
and has also influenced the practice of the CFI. In September
2002, the CFI in two cases involving the fortification of animal
food with antibiotics acknowledged the precautionary principle
as being part of Community law and referred, inter alia, to the
EFTA Court's judgment in the Kellogg Case. 2 1 In September
2003, the ECJ in Monsanto Agricoltura Italia SpA & Others v. Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri & Others ("Monsanto") decided on
a case concerning the release of genetically modified maize.20 2
It too relied on EFTA Court Kellogg Case when stating that "protective measures... may not properly be based on a purely hypothetical approach to risk, founded on mere suppositions which
are not yet scientifically verified."202 The most important judgment in the field is undoubtedly the ECJ's ruling in Commission
v. Denmark.2 4 The facts of the case were similar to the ones in
the EFTA Court's Kellogg Case. 2 5 AG Mischo proposed that the
197. Id.
26.
198. See id. 30.
199. See id. 9 32.
200. See id. 33.
201. See Pfizer Animal Health v. European Union, Case T-13/99, [2002] E.C.R. II3305; Alpharma v. Council of the European Union, Case T-70/99, [2002] E.C.R. II3495.
202. Case C-236/01, [2003] E.C.R. 1-8105.
203. Id. 1 106.
204. Case C-192/01, [2003] E.C.R. 1-9693.
205. See id. 1 1.
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Court acknowledge the precautionary principle along the lines
developed by the EFTA Court in Kellogg.2" 6 However, he wanted
to save the nutritional need argument and took the view that the
ECJ should dismiss the Commission's application.2" 7 The ECJ
followed the EFTA Court's ruling in its entirety. 20 It held that it
was not sufficient for a government to make the argument that a
marketing ban on fortified foodstuffs may be justified by the
sheer lack of a nutritional need in the respective country. 20 9 At
the same time, the ECJ recognized the precautionary principle
and formulated the same conditions for its application as the
EFTA Court had done in Kellogg. The ECJ ruled in favor of the
Commission.2 1 In a preliminary ruling case, the ECJ confirmed
its stand with regard to the significance of the precautionary
principle in foodstuff law.21 1 In this case, the link to the EFTA
Court was established by AG Mischo.21 2
. B. Community Courts InterpretingEEA Law
The EEA Agreement was concluded by the European Community on the basis of EC Article 310.213 According to settled
case law, its provisions form an integral part of the Community
legal order.2 14 It goes without saying that the cross-fertilization
between the EFTA Court and the Community courts may be particularly intense in proceedings in which the Community courts
have to give an interpretation of EEA law. Cases concerning the
"principle of homogeneity" in general, EEA/EFTA States' liability, free movement of capital, and food safety law are to be mentioned here. In CFI Opel Austria GmbH v. Council of the European
206. See id. 1 49-52.
207. See Opinion of Advocate-General Mischo, Commission v. Denmark, [2003]
E.C.R. 77.
208. See id. It 4-52.
209. See id. 54.
210. See id. 54.
211. SeeJohn Greenham v. Lonard Abel, Case C-95/01, [2004] E.C.R. -,
43.
212. See Opinion of Advocate-General Mischo, John Greenham v. Lonard Abel,
Case C-95/01, [2004] E.C.R. _, 11 44, 53.
213. See EC Treaty, supra note 30, art. 310, O.J. C 224/1 (1992); see also European
Parliament, The European Economic Area (EEA), available at http://www.europarl.int/factsheets/6_3_2_en.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
214. See Conceria Daniele Bresciani v. Amministrazione Italiana delle Finanze,
Case 87/75, [1976] E.C.R. 129, 25; see also Hauptzollamt Mainz v. C.A. Kupferberg &
Cie KG a.A, Case 104/81, [1982] E.C.R. 3641,
23.
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Union,2 15 a case on the compatibility with the EEA Agreement of
a Council Regulation withdrawing tariff concessions by imposing
a 4.9% duty on certain F-15 car gearboxes produced by General
Motors Austria and originating in Austria, the CFI dealt with the
homogeneity goal informing the EEA Agreement and referred,
with regard to the interpretation of Surveillance and Court
Agreement Article 3(2), to the judgments of the EFTA Court in
Restamark2 1 6 and in Scottish Salmon Growers Assoc. Ltd. v. EFTA Surveillance Auth. 2 17 The CFI found that the EEA Agreement involves a high degree of integration, with objectives exceeding
those of a mere free-trade agreement, 218 and that the significance in regard to the interpretation and application of the
Agreement and of the contracting parties' objective to establish
a dynamic and homogeneous EEA had not been diminished by
the ECJ's Opinion 1/91.219 The CFI further held that Article 10
of the EEA Agreement, the provision corresponding to Articles
12, 13, 16, and 17 of the EC Treaty, has direct effect in Community law. 220 The ECJ's Bellio F.lli Srl v. Prefettura di Treviso case
concerned, inter alia, the compatibility of two decisions of the
Council and the EC Commission on certain Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy ("BSE") protection measures with EEA Article
13.221 Except for referring in a comprehensive way to the EFTA
Court's Kellogg Case judgment, 2 22 the ECJ stated that "both the
Court and the EFTA Court have recognized the need to ensure
that the rules of the EEA Agreement which are identical in substance to those of the Treaty are interpreted uniformly. ' 223 Insofar as the ECJ referred to its Ospelt & Schl'ssle Weissenberg
Familienstiftungjudgment224 and to the EFTA Court's judgment
in EFTA SurveillanceAuth. v. Iceland,22 5 which in the relevant paragraph itself contains a reference to ECJ Ospelt, one will notice
215. Case T-115/97, [1997] E.C.R. 11-39.
216. Case E-1/94, [1994-1995] Rep. EFI'A Ct. 15
217. Case E-2/94, [1994-1995] Rep. EFTA Ct. 59.
218. See Opel Austria, [1997] E.C.R. IH-39,
107.
219. See Opinion 1/91 of the Court of Justice on the EEA Agreement, [1991]
109.
E.C.R. 1-6097; see also Opel Austria, [1997] E.C.R. 11-39,
220. See Opel Austria, [1997] E.C.R. 11-39, 1 102.
221. Case C-286/02, [2004] E.C.R. -, [2004] 3 C.M.L.R. 34.
222. See EFTA Surveillance Auth. v. The Kingdom of Norway, Case E-3/00, [20012002] Rep. EFTA Ct. 75; Bellio F.11i Sr, Case C-286/02, [2004] E.C.R..
34.
223. Bellio Elli Srl, [2004] E.C.R. -,
224. Case C-452/01, [2003] E.C.R. 1-9743.
27.
225. Case E-1/03, [2003] Rep. EFTA Ct. 143,
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that ECJ Ospelt, a case on free movement of capital in the EEA, is,
for its part, linked to the EFTA Court's ruling in islandsbanki26
by way of a reference in AG Geelhoed's opinion. 227 The EFTA
Court has, for its part, made reference to the ECJ's decision in
Ospelt and to its own judgment in EFTA Surveillance Auth. v. Iceland in Fokus Bank ASA v. The Norwegian State, a free movement of
2 28
capital case.
In its 1999 Rechberger v. Republik Osterreich229 judgment, the
ECJ was, inter alia, asked by the Landesgericht Linz whether the
principle of State liability applied in Austria after January 1,
1994, in view of the fact that Austria had become part of the EEA
on that date. Austria had not implemented the Package Tour
Directive in good time, and travelers had suffered damage.25 ° In
view of the planned accession of four of them to the E.U., the
five EFTA/EEA States had entered into an Agreement on transitional arrangements for a period after the accession of certain
EFTA States to the E.U. on September 28, 1994.231 According to
Article 5 of this Agreement, after accession, new preliminary ruling proceedings could only be brought before the EFTA Court
in cases in which the facts occurred before accession, and where
the application was lodged with the Court within three months
after accession. Under Article 7 of that Agreement, the EFTA
Court of five judges was to conclude all pending cases within six
months after accession.2 3 2 OnJanuary 1, 1995, Austria, Finland,
and Sweden joined the EU. In its ruling of June 15, 1999, the
ECJ held that Austria was, according to EEA Article 7 in conjunction with Section 11 of Protocol 1 to the EEA Agreement, required to transpose the directive in question on the day the EEA
Agreement entered into force, on January 1, 1994.233 However,
226. Case E-1/00, [2000-2001] Rep. EFTA Ct. 8.
227. See Opinion of Advocate-General Geelhoed, Ospelt, Case C-452/01, [2003]
E.C.R. 1-9743.
228. SeeJudgment of November 23, 2004, Fokus Bank ASA v. The Norwegian State,
represented by Skattedirektoratet (the Directorate of Taxes), Case E-1/04, 22 (not yet
reported).
229. Case C-140/97, [1999] E.C.R. 1-3499, [2000] 2 C.M.L.R. 1.
230. See id. 17.
231. See Agreement on transitional arrangements for a period after the accession
of certain EFTA States to the European Union, [1994-1995] Rep. EFTA Ct. 161-64.
232. See Samuelsson v. Svenska staten, Case E-1/95, [1994-1995] Rep. EFTA Ct.
146. Samuelsson was referred to the EFTA Court by the Varbergs tingsrdtt, Sweden, on
March 2, 1995 and decided by the EFTA Court on June 20, 1995.
233. See Rechberger, [1999] E.C.R. at Ruling
2.
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the Court declared itself not competent to rule on a question of
interpretation related to the application by Austria of the EEA
Agreement during the period preceding its accession to the
Community. 23 4 The Court went on, however, by stating:
Moreover, in view of the objective of uniform interpretation
and application which informs the EEA Agreement, it should
be pointed out that the principles governing the liability of
an EFTA State for infringement of a directive referred to in
the EEA Agreement were the subject of the EFTA Court's
judgment of 10 December 1998 in Sveinbj6rnsd6ttir.23 5
One will conclude from this that the Austrian judge was at least
indirectly encouraged to grant compensation in this case provided that the conditions set out by the EFTA Court in Sveinbj6rnsd6ttir (which correspond to those developed in Community law
by the ECJ) were fulfilled. It appears that compensation was in
fact paid in the framework of a settlement before the referring
Austrian court. For the sake of completeness, it must be added
that in the Karlsson case,23 6 the Norwegian government invited
the EFTA Court to overrule Sveinbj6rnsd6ttir. In rejecting the
government's position, the EFTA Court in turn referred to ECJ's
Rechberger.237 One commentator has noted that with this, the
EFTA Court has in a skilful way taken the ECJ as an ally on
board. 3 8
In the Ospelt case, a Liechtenstein citizen owning agricultural land in Vorarlberg, Austria had been refused authorization
to transfer that land to a foundation established in Liechtenstein. 2 3' The ECJ held that a rule such as that of the
Vorarlberger Land Transfer Law, making transactions between
nationals of States party to the EEA Agreement relating to agricultural land subject to administrative controls, must be assessed
in light of Article 40 and Annex XII of that Agreement, "which
are provisions possessing the same legal scope as that of Article
73b of the EC Treaty (currently Article 56 of the EC Treaty),
234. See id. 38.
235. Id. 39.
236. See Karlsson v. Icelandic State, Case E-4/01, [2002] Rep. EFTA Ct. 242, 248-

49,

24-34.

237. See id. 25.
238. See Georg Gorton, Bestdtigung der Staatshaftungsrechtsprechungdes EFTA-Gerichtshofs, 7-8 EUR. L. REP. 260, 263 (2002).
239. See Ospelt v. Schl6ssle Weissenberg Familienstiftung, Case C-452/01, [2003]
E.C.R. 1-9743,
2.
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which is identical in substance. ' 240 The ECJ stressed that "one of
the principal aims of the EEA Agreement is to provide for the
fullest possible realization of the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital within the whole European Economic
Area, so that the internal market established within the European Union is extended to the EFTA States."2 4 1 It is to be noted
that the ECJ referred in that respect to its EEA-friendly Opinion
1/92.242 Based on these contentions, the ECJ found that the
provisions of the EC Treaty on the free movement of capital
(which are identical to the respective provisions of the EEA
Agreement) do not preclude the requirement of a prior authorization, but "do preclude such authorization being refused in
every case in which the acquirer does not himself farm the land
concerned as part of a holding and on which he is not resident. ' 2 43 As stated above, AG Geelhoed had in his Opinion referred to the EFTA Court's islandsbanki ruling, in which the
EFITA Court had assumed that the provisions of the EEA Agreement and of the EC Treaty on free movement of capital are essentially identical in substance in spite of the fact that the latter
have been amended in Maastricht. 24 4 In his recent judgment in
the Fokus Bank case, the EFTA Court, referring to the ECJ's ruling and AG Geelhoed's Opinion in the Ospelt case as well as its
Islandsbankijudgment,confirmed that view.24 5
In the above-mentioned Bellio case, Bellio had imported
from Norway a consignment of fish flour for the production of
feed for animals other than ruminants. 24 6 After samples taken
by the competent Italian authority showed that the fish meal
contained fragments of unidentified animal bones, the consignment in question was seized. 24 7 Bellio brought proceedings in
the Treviso Court, which referred to the ECJ, inter alia, a ques240. Opinion of Advocate-General Geelhoed, Ospelt, Case C-452/01, [2003] E.C.R.
1-9743 (operative part).
241. Id. 29.
242. See id.
243. Id. at Ruling
2.
244. See id. at n.32.
245. SeeJudgment of November 23, 2004, Fokus Bank ASA v. The Norwegian State,
represented by Skattedirektoratet (the Directorate of Taxes), Case E-1/04, 23 (not yet
reported).
246. See Bellio F.11i
Srl v. Prefettura di Treviso, Case C-286/02, [2004] E.C.R. -,
21.
247. See id.
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tion concerning the application of the "precautionary principle. ' 24" The seizure was based on two decisions of the Council
and the EC Commission on certain BSE protection measures.2 4 9
The ECJ found that the provisions on which the seizure had
been based were compatible with EEA Article 13, the provision
mirroring EC Article 30.250 With regard to the "precautionary
principle" and the conditions of its application, the ECJ referred
to EFTA Court's Kelloggand1 to those judgments of the ECJ which
25
are based on that ruling.
IV. BEYOND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AREA
The ECJ has a long-standing tradition of referring to the
European Convention on Human Rights (European Convention) and to judgments of the European Court of Human Rights
in cases involving fundamental rights. 2 5 2 Fundamental rights are
part of the general principles of EC law. The EFTA Court has
followed suit on the first occasion. In TV 1000,253 the Court interpreted the transmitting State principle underlying the Television without Frontiers Directive 89/552 and referred to the freedom of expression granted by European Convention Article 10
as well as, with regard to the limitations of that freedom, to the
landmark ruling of the European Court of Human Rights in
Handyside v. United Kingdom. 25 41 In Technologien Bau- und Wirtschaftsberatung GmbH & Bellona Foundation v. EFTA Surveillance
Auth.,25 5 the EFTA Court dealt with an action for nullity against a
decision of the EFTA Surveillance Authority approving State aid.
It held that access to justice constitutes an essential element of
the EEA legal framework.2 5 6 The EFTA Court pointed to the
significance of the judicial function which is inspired by the idea
that of human rights appeared to be on the increase, both on
248. See id. 25.
249. See id. 39
250. See id. 7 31-35.
251. See id. 7 57-60.
252. See, e.g., Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, Case 44/79, [1979] E.C.R. 3727; Regina v. Kent Kirk, Case 63/83, [1984] E.C.R. 2689; Johnston v. Chief Constable of the
Royal Ulster Constabulary, Case 222/84, [1986] E.C.R. 1651, [1986] 3 C.M.L.R. 240.
253. TV 1000 Sverige AB v. Norwegian Gov't, Case E-8/97, [1998] Rep. EFTA Ct.
70, 78,
26.
254. [1979] 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 737.
255. Case E-2/02, [2003] Rep. EFTA Ct. 52, 36.
256. See id. 36.
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the national and international level. 257 The EFTA Court's case
law culminated in Public Prosecutorv. Asgeirsson,2 5 8 also referred to
as the Bacalhao case. In these proceedings, one of the defendants in the national proceedings had alleged that the reference
of the case to the EFTA Court prolonged the duration of the
proceedings and thereby infringed European Convention Article 6.259 The EFTA Court held in a general way that provisions
of the EEA Agreement as well as procedural provisions of the
Surveillance and Court Agreement are to be interpreted in the
light of fundamental rights and that the provisions of the European Convention and the judgments of the European Court of
Human Rights are important sources for determining the scope
of these rights. 26 0 With regard to the right to a fair and public
hearing within a reasonable time granted by European Convention Article 6(1), the EFTA Court observed that the European
Court of Human Rights held, in a case concerning a delay of two
years and seven months due to a reference by a national court to
the ECJ for a preliminary ruling, that to take this period into
consideration would adversely affect the system instituted by Article 177 of the EEC Treaty (currently Article 234 of the EC
Treaty) and work against the aim pursued in substance in that
Article. 26 1 The EFTA Court found that the same must apply with
regard to the procedure established under Surveillance and
Court Agreement Article 34, which, as a means of inter-court cooperation, contributes to the proper functioning of the EEA
Agreement to the benefit of individuals and economic operators. 26 2 The EFTA Court added that in the present case the period from the registration of the request to the delivery of judg263
ment amounted to a little more than five months.
V. BEYOND EUROPE?
The EFTA Court sometimes deals with issues in which a
look beyond the boundaries of Europe could be useful. Cases
concerning the international exhaustion of intellectual property
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

See id. 37.
Case E-2/03, [2003] Rep. EFTA Ct.
See id. 23.
See id.
See Pafitis & Others v. Greece, [1999] 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 566, 601,
See Akaeruvaldd, [2003] Rep. EFTA Ct. 24.
See id.

95.
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rights,26 4 the relationship between collective bargaining and
competition law,2 65 the question of whether certain agreements

restricting competition should be dealt with under a U.S.-style
rule of reason 2 66 or the question whether the fortification of
foodstuffs ought to be governed by the "precautionary principle '' 261 could be mentioned in that context. The EFTA Court
unlike the ECJ, does, however, not have a research department
nor does it have an AG. Its means to carry out a comparative
analysis going beyond the EEA (which actually consists of twenty
eight countries) are therefore extremely limited. It is still possible for the judges and their cabinets to do comparative work. In
cases in which the ECJ has been dealing with one or several parallel or similar cases, materials concerning ideas from outside of
Europe may be made available to the EFTA Court in the Opinion (s) of the AG. An example is provided by AG Jacobs' Opinion in Albany Int'l BV v. Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie which gives a comparative overview of the legal situation with
regard to the relationship of collective bargaining and competition law in several European jurisdictions and in the United
States.2 6 8 In the Landsorganisasjoneni Norge (Norwegian Federation

of Trade Unions) v. KommunalansattesFellesorganisasjon(Norwegian
Confederation of MunicipalEmployees) case, the EFTA Court referenced AG Jacobs' opinion 269 and found that, when assessing
whether a collective agreement was caught by the EEA competition rules, the good faith of the parties in concluding and imple270
menting that agreement was to be taken into account.
Whether the collective bargaining has been carried out bonafide
264. See Mag Instrument Inc. v. Cal. Trading Co. Norway, Ulsteen, Case E-2/97,
19.
[1997] Rep. EFTA Ct. 129, 134,
265. See Norwegian Fed. of Trade Unions & Others v. Norwegian Ass'n. of Local &
Regional Auth. & Others, Case E-8/00, [2002] Rep. EFTA Ct. 116.
266. SeeJan & KristianJxeger AS v. Opel Norge AS, Case E-3/97, [1998] Rep. EFIA
Ct. 3; see also Hegelstad Eiendomsselskap Arvid B. Hegelstad & Others v. Hydro Texaco
AS, Case E-7/01, [2002] Rep. EFTA Ct. 310.
267. See EFTA Surveillance Auth. v. The Kingdom of Norway, Case E-3/00, [20012002] Rep. EFTA Ct. 73, 82,
25.
268. SeeAlbany Int'l BV v. Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie, Joined
opinion in Case C-67/96, Brentjens' Handelsonderneming BV v. Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds voor de Handel in Bouwmaterialen, C-115/97 to C-117/97, Maatschappij
Drijvende Bokken BV v. Stichting Pensioenfonds voor de Vervoer- en Havenbedrijven,
Case C-219/97, [1999] E.C.R. 1-05751.
269. Case E-8/00, [2002] Rep. EFTA Ct. 116, 129, 35
270. See id. 56.
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2 71
may be an issue in U.S. law.
To date, the EFTA Court has not openly acted as a giver of
ideas beyond Europe. This result is hardly surprising in view of
the Court's size and the fact that its case load is limited. Certain
rulings have nevertheless prompted reactions outside of the European law community. 272 Considering the effect of its case law
on State liability, the EFTA Court may have made a contribution
to the development of international law in general.27 3

VI. CONCLUSIONS
The vertical dialogue with the national courts of the EEA/
EFTA States, in particular the Supreme Courts, has assisted the
EFTA Court in developing its case law concerning effect and
State liability. Through this jurisprudence, EEA homogeneity in
the field of effect and State liability has been maintained. The
EEA Main Agreement has been implemented in the domestic
legal orders of the EFTA States. EEA secondary law is being implemented in an ongoing process. The same holds true for the
rulings of the EFTA Court. There has, to this writer's knowledge, never been a case in which a national court refused to set
aside a conflicting rule of domestic law, at least not in a vertical
context. That fact is also important from a reciprocity perspective. "[S] ince EFTA operators benefit from the characteristics of
direct effect and supremacy of the EC legal order to enforce
their EEA rights within the EC national Courts, their EC coun271. See Brown v. Pro Football Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 238 (1996).
272. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw, 515 (2001)
(regarding the EFTA Court's Maglitejudgment); see also Irene Calboli, Trademark Exhaustion in the European Union: Community-Wide or International? The Saga Continues, 6
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 47, 70 (2002); Juliane Kokott & Patricia Egli, International

Decision: Sebago Inc. & Ancienne Maison Dubois & Fits, SA v. GB-UNIC SA, Case C-1 73/98,
Court of Justice of the European Communities, July 1, 1999, 94 AM. J. INT'L L., 386, 389
(2000); Marco M. Slotboom, Do Public Health Measures Receive Similar Treatment in European Community and World Trade Organization Law?, 37(3) J. WORLD TRADE 553, 585
(2003) (regarding the EFTA Court's Kellogg'sjudgment); Atle Sonmsteli Johansen, The
"Albany-Test" compared with the "EFTA Guidelines", 33 INDUS. L. J. 73 (2004) (regarding
the EFTA Court's Landsorganisasjonenjudgment); Thomas Hays, Paranova v. Merck and
Co-Branding of Pharmaceuticals in the European Economic Area, 94 TRADEMARK REP. 821
(2004); Thomas Trelogan et al., The European Free Trade Association Court and Positive
Action, 28 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 25, 27-34 (2004) (discussing the EFTA
Court's University of Oslo judgment in EFTA Surveillance Auth. v. The Kingdom of Norway).
273. See, e.g.,
Ole Spiermann, The Other Side of the Story: An Unpopular Essay on the
Making of the European Community Legal Order, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 763, 763-89 (1999).
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terparts should be in a similar position to obtain a comparable
level of legal redress in the EFTA national Courts."274
With respect to the horizontal dialogue with the Community Courts, one must remember that in its Opinion 1/91 on the
first version of the EEA Agreement the ECJ struck down a provision according to which the Community courts would have been
under an obligation to take into account the case law of the EEA
courts.2 75 In practice, the Community courts have shown open-

ness in cases in which they agree with the outcome as well as with
the reasoning of an EFTA Court decision. The EFTA Court is
the only court besides the European Court of Human Rights
which is referred to in the judgments of the ECJ and of the
CF12 7 6 One-quarter of the judgments rendered by the EFTA
Court in its first ten years of existence have prompted reactions
by the ECJ, by the CFI, by Advocates-General, or by national
courts of EC Member States, particularly by English courts. The
Community courts' policy is less clear in cases in which they do
not agree with the reasoning of an EFTA Court decision. The
ECJ, in particular, seems to be reluctant to enter a debate in
such cases.2 7 7 One will nevertheless have to assume that in such

cases, EFTA Court rulings will have entered Community judges'
minds. For the sake of order, it must be pointed out that there
has not been a judicial conflict between the ECJ and the EFTA
Court in the first ten years of EEA existence, not even in cases in
274. See Editorial comments: European Economic Area and European Community: Homogeneity of Legal Orders?, 36 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 697-98 (1999); see also Sev6n & Johansson, supra note 53, at 384.
If individuals and economic operators would not be ensured the same possibility of invoking the Agreement there would be an imbalance in the Agreement.
While individuals and economic operators from the EFTA States would be in
the position to invoke the Agreement before courts and administrative authorities in the EC Member States, this would not be the case for individuals and
economic operators from the EC Member States in the EFTA States.
Sev6n & Johansson, supra note 53, at 384.
275. See Opinion 1/91 of the Court of Justice on the EEA Agreement, [1991]
E.C.R. 1-6097, 1 3.
276. See, e.g.,
Francis G. Jacobs, JudicialDialogue and the Cross-Fertilizationof Legal
Systems: The European Court ofJustice, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 547, 552 (2003); Christiaan Timmermans, The European Union's Judicial System, 41 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 393, 400
(2004).
277. A case in point could have been the ECJ's judgment in Sweden v. Franzin,
Case C-189/95, [1997] E.C.R. 1-5909 which dealt with essentially the same questions as
the EFTA Court's Tore Wilhelmsen AS v. Oslo kommune, Case E-6/96, [1997] Rep.
EFTA Ct. 53.
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which the EFTA Court had to decide on a legal question as the
first EEA court. The only cases in which the outcome the ECJ
reached a conclusion that was not in line with an earlier EFTA
Court decision were characterized by a difference of facts and of
law.

27 8

278. See Mag Instrument Inc. v. California Trading Co. Norway, Ulsteen, Case E-2/
97, [1997] Rep. EFTA Ct. 127; see also Silhouette Int'l Schmied GmbH & Co. KG v.
Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft mbH, Case C-355/96, [1998] E.C.R. 1-4799, 2 C.M.L.R953. See supra note 138-48 and accompanying text.

